© Media Watch 10 (3) 522-538, 2019
ISSN 0976-0911 E-ISSN 2249-8818
DOI: 10.15655/mw/2019/v10i3/49683
Conjuring the ‘Insane’: Representations of
Mental Illness in Medical and Popular Discourses
Sathyaraj Venkatesan & Sweetha Saji
National Institute of Technology (Trichy), India
Representation, primarily
understood as ‘presence’ or ‘appearance’ with an implied visual component, is a
critical concept in the cultural milieu. Conceived as images, performances, and
imitations, representations propagate through various media: films, television,
photographs, advertisements, and other forms of popular culture. As such, representations of mental illness
perform a pivotal role in framing perceptions about the mentally ill. These
representations influence and shape public perceptions about the illness. This
essay aims to analyze how mental illness is perceived, represented, and treated
in popular culture and medical discourses. In so doing, the essay lays bare the
ideologies and the symbolic codes that undergird these representations and the
consequent stigma confronted by the mentally ill. Taking these cues, the essay
close reads popular representations of mental illness in movies, newspapers,
advertisements, comics, and paintings and the articulation of stereotyped
images of the mentally ill in a medical discourse which externalize madness in
distorted physiognomic features. In so doing, the essay exposes the negative
implications of these representations on the personal and social lives of the
mentally ill and negotiates the significance of personal accounts of mental
illness experience as a means of reclaiming their identity.
Keywords: Media, mental illness, metaphors,
representation, stigma
“The selection of a
specific representational system is related
to the entity described
but is not interchangeable with that entity.
It is the means by which
the observer can order his perception of reality.”
--Seeing the Insane Sander Gilman
“And I have known the eyes already, known them all—
The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase,
And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin,
When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
Then how should I begin
To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways?
And how should I presume?”
--“The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” T. S. Eliot
Representation, primarily understood as
‘presence’ or ‘appearance’ with an implied visual component, is a critical
concept in the cultural milieu. Conceived as “clear images, material reproductions,
performances, and simulations” (Baldonado, 2017), representations propagate
through various media: films, television, photographs, advertisements, and
other forms of popular culture. In Picture Theory,
W. J. T. Mitchell elaborates the function of representation thus:
“representation (in memory, in verbal descriptions,
in images) not only ‘mediates’ our knowledge (of slavery and many other
things), but obstructs fragments, and negates that knowledge” (p. 188). In other words, representation does not only
mediate the knowledge we consume; it also affects knowledge through fragmenting
and negating the knowledge. Thus, representation constructs knowledge. Second,
Mitchell resists the notion of representations as particular kinds of objects.
Instead, he treats them “as relationship, a process, as the relay mechanism in
exchanges of power, value, and publicity” (420). Mitchell’s model proposes an approach to
representation with an eye toward the relationships and processes through which
representations are produced, valued, and exchanged. As such, Andrew Edgar
and Peter Sedgwick in Key Concepts in Cultural Theory characterizes
‘representation’ as “the ‘presentation’ or construction of identity [which] may
be closely allied to questions of ideology and power, and to the forms of
discourse implicated in the procedures whereby such images are created” (p. 225).
In a similar vein, Ella Shohat (1995) poses some fundamental questions on the nature of representations
and the ideologies that frame them: “[e]ach filmic or academic utterance must
be analyzed not only in terms of who represents but also in terms of who is
being represented for what purpose, at which historical moment, for which
location, using which strategies, and in what tone of address.” (p. 173).
Shohat’s questions on the ideological framework
that determines the nature of representations also lay bare the politics of
representation. Rather than perceiving representations as “harmless likenesses”
(Baldonado, 2017), they must be analyzed for how they impact perceptions.
Stuart Hall addresses the politics of representation in Representation:
Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices in that he approaches
representation as to the medium or channel through which
production of meaning happens. He assumes that objects or people do not
have stable, true meanings, but rather that the meanings are produced by
participants in a culture, who have the power to signify something (p. 19).
Clearly, for Hall, representation involves understanding how language and systems of
knowledge production work together to produce and circulate meanings.
Representation becomes the process or channel through which these meanings are
both created and reified.
As such, abuse of the power of representation can
be observed in several socio-cultural phenomena, especially in the context of
AIDS in the 1980s and slavery during colonialism. Nancy L Roth and Katy Hogan
in Gendered Epidemic: Representations of Women in the Age of AIDS (1998)
explore the representations of AIDS in mainstream and medical discourse along
these lines. As such, they cite several mainstream media and medical news
reports which represent AIDS as “a new mystery disease plaguing gay men”;
“epidemic of immune deficiency” and the plight of “hemophiliacs and infants,
the ‘innocent victims’ of the epidemic” (p. 115). They underline the role of
perspective or framing in the production of negative representations of illness
based on “media frames” theory of Hall. In so doing, they seek to explain how
“hegemonic discourse selects, orders, or excludes certain versions of reality
in its effort to organize the world according to its purposes” (Roth &Hogan,
1998, p. 136).
Paula A. Treichler (2006) questions the
correspondence that is presumed to exist between “the representation of [AIDS]
virus and its reality” by examining the features of culture that determine the
form in which reality is constructed and the “role of language in articulation
and popularizing a particular construction” (p. 151). Treichler (2006) observes
that by 1986, the major newsmagazines in the US were running the cover stories
on “the grave danger that AIDS posed to heterosexuals” (p. 18). As such,
representations of AIDS as a ‘gay disease’ in news magazines, televisions, and
posters in a way not only protects “sexual practices of heterosexuality but
also heterosexuality’s ideological superiority” (Treichler, 2006, pp. 22-23).
These ideological tools were operated in subtle ways of visual representations
of AIDS in popular magazines. The severity of the epidemic was heightened by a
shift from images of gay men with their arms entwined, aloof gay man in a
backlit apartment, and prostitutes in red working the streets at night to
nuclear families, “innocent victims” and middle-American patriots who were at
‘risk.’ For instance, the July 1985 issue of Life magazine contributed a
distinct iconography of the epidemic that suggests this shift. As Treichler (2006)
observes:
In
living color, photographs of people with AIDS stared out at the reader: an
African-American soldier in uniform, saluting; the Burks, a white all-American
nuclear family (father, mother, daughter, baby-son); and an attractive young
blonde woman. In bold red letters, the cover warned that “NOW NO ONE IS SAFE
FROM AIDS.” . . . The cover illustration made visual the magazine’s position:
“AIDS is a problem for all.” An effort was made, in other words, to articulate
AIDS to important elements of liberal democracy—we’re all equal, we’re in this
together, we are family—and to freight the “faces of AIDS” on the cover. (pp. 75-76)
Representations, thus act as ideological tools
of interpretation that control perceptions about the marginalized who do not
hold power over their representations. Stereotyped representations of Africans
served as ideological tools supporting colonialism and slavery. Moreover, they
served to justify racial difference, segregation and protected the freedom that
white supremacists enjoyed. European representations of Africa and its people
as ‘dark,’ ‘savage,’ and ‘violent,’ perpetuated a perverse opposite to its
‘civilized’ life, thereby maintaining European superiority as self-evident. Edward Said,
in his analysis of textual representations of the Orient in Orientalism(2000),
proposes that representations cannot be realistic:
In any instance of at
least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a
re-presence, or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent
veracity of a written statement about the Orient, therefore, relies very little
on, and cannot instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. (p. 88)
Said dispels the objectivity claimed by European representations of
Africa as constructed images interspersed with clear ideological content.
Similarly,
representations of mental illness perform a pivotal role in framing perceptions
about the mentally ill. These representations are not devoid of meaning and
hence influence and shape public perceptions about the illness. Sensationalized
images of the mentally ill, for instance, leads to stereotyping of mental
illness as a disease of deviance contributing to the stigma that negatively
impacts those who experience the travails of the illness. Ato Quayson
(2007) in “Aesthetic Nervousness” argues that “the representation of disability
oscillates uneasily between the aesthetic and the ethical domains” and that the
disability representation “from the perspective of the disabled” is crucially
distinct “from the normative position of the nondisabled” (p. 205). Worse still, scientific accounts of mental
illness are also not productively equipped to dismantle misconceptions;
instead, they concentrate on symptoms over the lived experience of the patients
as individuals. As Gilman rightly comments on the negative visualizations of
madness in medicine and popular art in Seeing the Insane, our
understanding of the mentally ill is predicated on “the continued presence in
society of older images of the insane, images that overtly or covertly color
our concept and serve to categorize them upon first glance” (1982, p. iii). As
these mediations of madness can be copied or reproduced, their accessibility
increases on a mass level and gradually leading to its legitimization.
This essay aims to analyze
how mental illness is perceived, represented, and treated in popular culture
and medical discourses. In so doing, the essay lays bare the ideologies and the
symbolic codes that undergird these representations and the consequent stigma
confronted by the mentally ill. Although ‘popular culture’ is interpreted as
“the culture that appeals to, or that is most comprehensible by, the general
public,” the term is used frequently “either to identify a form of culture that
is opposed to another form, or as a synonym or complement to that other form”
(Edgar & Sedgwick, 2005, pp. 190-191). As such, popular culture may refer
either to “individual artefacts (often treated as texts) such as a popular song
or a television programme, or to a group’s lifestyle (and thus to the pattern
of artefacts, practices and understandings that serve to establish the group’s
distinctive identity)” (p. 191). Taking these cues, the essay close reads
popular representations of mental illness (such as schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder) in movies, newspapers, advertisements, comics, and paintings and the
articulation of stereotyped images of the mentally ill in a medical discourse
which externalize madness in distorted physiognomic features. In so doing, the essay
exposes the negative implications of these representations on the personal and
social lives of the mentally ill.
Mental Illness: Definitions and
Perspectives
Psychiatry, one of the
oldest of the medical specialties in the treatment of the mentally ill, grew
into prominence by the dawn of modern science and during the Enlightenment.
Grounded on scientific postulates, psychiatry followed the method of investigation
with clear and detailed case descriptions and objectives. However, the
influence of the Enlightenment ideals, which emphasized the value of dignity
and individuality of the human being led to the inclusion of a variety of
psychotherapeutic techniques personalizing the care to the individual’s needs.
In such an amalgamation of the benefits of modern science with the philosophy
of the Enlightenment, psychiatry gained a moral grounding that it strived to
maintain. By the rise of Freudian psychoanalysis as an alternative approach to
mentalscapes in the mid-twentieth century, psychiatry was challenged with its
declining emphasis on observable signs and symptoms. Psychoanalysis in general,
focussed on intrapsychic conflicts over diagnosis and classifications. As a
response to this critical turn, the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
codified various psychiatric disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Although the DSM existed before the rise
of psychoanalysis, it was in 1980 that the APA initiated the need for a
definition of mental disorders in the third edition of the DSM. Aimed at
maximum reliability and validity, DSM-III and its revised fourth edition
gradually became “universally and uncritically accepted as the ultimate
authority on psychopathology and diagnosis” (Andreasen, 2007, p. 111). Mental
illness, as given in the DSM, refers to the spectrum of cognition, emotions,
and behaviors that interfere with interpersonal relationships as well as
familial and societal functions (Johnstone, 2001). As such, the DSM is still
commonly recognized as the ‘psychiatric bible.’
However, this codification aimed at defending
psychiatry’s scientific status had a dehumanizing impact. In being reduced to
mere checklists, clinicians who frequented the DSM as a toolkit failed to
approach patients as individuals. The immediate requirement of codified data
was fulfilled at the cost of comprehensive descriptions that addressed patient
needs. Moreover, certain categories of mental disorders listed in the DSM were
not tested for validity. Also, taking into account the different forms of
interference caused by mental illness in an individual’s daily functioning, a
study by Hardcastle and Hardcastle (2003) revealed that 30% of all general
practitioner consultations involved mental illness. They also reported that one
in four people is prone to mental illness at some time in her or his life.
Adding to this crisis, as Horgan (2013) remarks, unlike “definitions of
ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a
consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory
measure.” In the absence of a valid theoretical basis for drug treatment, the
mentally ill are often over-medicated and given prescriptions based on
assumptions.
In the subsequent editions of the DSM, alternative
perspectives from social, cultural, political dimensions were regarded as
significant prerequisites accompanying the characteristic symptoms of a
particular diagnosis. These additional aspects of diagnosis were aimed at
developing clinicians’ sensitivity to the patients’ resilience and personal
experiences over their perceived deficits. The latest edition of the DSM
(DSM-5) has created a common lexicon used by psychiatrists and mental health
care providers in the diagnosis of mental disorders. Evolved as a comprehensive
guide to understand the nuances of living with and perceiving mental disorders,
the DSM-5 takes into account both clinical and cultural symptoms in determining
the diagnosis. As such, the manual provides a list of factors and interview
questions in terms of race, ethnicity, language, religion, social customs,
geographical origins, etc. in reckoning a patient’s illness experience.
Further, it also devotes distinct chapters on personal stories of mental
illness, thus validating the significance of cultural background and unique
personal traits alongside objective symptoms.
Subject to a range of revisions in four preceding
editions and a review process made public through a website www.DSM-5.org, the
current revision process was labelled as more open and democratic. In
rectifying several limitations of the previous edition (DSM-IV), DSM-5 strived
toward a more dynamic concept of culture. DSM-IV had de-emphasized the significance
of social contexts and depicted “culture as residing largely within
individuals” (Lopez and Guarnaccia, 2000, p. 574). Most definitions also tend
to portray culture as a static phenomenon and do not clarify how individuals
negotiate various cultural spheres. In this context, the revisions in DSM-5 was
lauded for its inclusivity and broadness. For instance, DSM-5 deeply elaborates
how culture should be understood:
Culture refers to systems
of knowledge, concepts, rules, and practices that are learned and transmitted
across generations. Culture includes language, religion and spirituality,
family structures, life-cycle stages, ceremonial rituals, and customs, as well
as moral and legal systems. . . These features of culture make it crucial not
to overgeneralize cultural information or stereotype groups in terms of fixed
cultural traits. (American Psychiatric Association, 2013a, p. 749)
As such, the APA has commented that its fifth edition
“incorporates a greater cultural sensitivity throughout the manual” (as cited
in Bredström, 2017). However, the manual tends to be read as a representative
voice of authoritative musings on mental illness and is accepted globally as
the rule book for diagnosing mental disorders. Despite these claims, there are
prevailing criticisms against DSM-5 as a “fiction” which medicalize human
experience.1 Gary Greenberg in his The Book of Woe: The DSM and
the Unmaking of Psychiatry argue that “by imposing a pseudoscientific model
of our ‘hopelessly complex’ inner world, it creates a ‘charade’ of non-existent
disorders” (as cited in Hicks, 2013). Critiqued for its over-diagnosis and
over-treatment, even psychiatrists admit that the DSM is flawed.
Moreover, the latest edition of the DSM, which claims
to be more inclusive of sociocultural contexts and the distinctions across
ethnic boundaries risks being relevant only for some patients. The latest
edition still subscribes to static notions of culture by specifying certain
symptoms as ‘universal’ and others as ‘culturally specific expressions.’ For
instance, in case of panic attacks, “uncontrollable crying and headaches” were
listed as culturally specific while “difficulty breathing” was listed as the
primary/universal symptom (American Psychiatric Association 2013b).
In this context, Foucault’s genealogical perspectives
on mental illness and institutions align with the voice of the vulnerable
subjects in the clinical equation even in contemporary clinical settings.
Foucault analyses how society conceived the defining attributes of the mentally
ill throughout history in his seminal book Madness and Civilization: A
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1965). Focusing
on the Renaissance to the twentieth century, Foucault observes that the figure
of the ‘madman’ had shifted from being an insider to an outsider from society.
Consequently, the ‘insane’ became an outcast who must be confined, studied, and
treated as a medical object. As part of this historical evolution, asylums were
established, which were meant to discipline the subject kept under the
supervision and authority of the doctor. Later, with the intervention of
positivist concerns in medicine and psychiatry, these regiments of power
operated in less visible forms. Even in the contemporary medical discourse,
symptomatic and categorical prescriptions on mental illness naturalize the
authority of medical voice over multiple expressions of the illness experience.
For instance, Foucault’s (1965) view of madness as “a reification of a magical
nature” (p. 276) which implies the translation of a concept into an object
correlate with objectives of modern psychiatry. As such, madness is not treated
as an abstraction that can be used to make sense of reality, but as a
biological reality that in reductive terms awaits clinical detection. The
DSM-based diagnoses, in particular, ratify such reification as recent studies observe
that diagnostic categories of the DSM are “nothing but conventional groupings
of symptoms” (Vanheule, 2014). Umbrella
terms used to designate a collection of symptoms, thus get popularized as
disease conditions that cause these symptoms, consequently affecting laymen and
blinding professionals towards the subjective dimensions of mental illness.
The Stigma of Mental
Illness
The
history of diagnoses and treatment of the mentally ill reveals a range of
practices and beliefs that centered on the autonomy of the healer and the
vulnerability of the patient whose identity across centuries shifted from being
an insider to an outcast lodged in isolated asylums. In the Middle Ages, the
mentally ill were considered to have been possessed by evil spirits, thus
trapped in a supernatural phenomenon. Such perceptions led to bizarre treatment
methods like trephining, a treatment procedure which
included chipping a hole or trephine into the skull to create an opening that
would release evil spirits and thus cure the person’s illness. In many
cultures, mental illness is perceived as divine punishment imposed on a person
who sinned against God and, therefore, as something an individual had imposed
on himself.
Consequently, the mentally ill were treated
with religious rituals to drive out evil spirits and included exorcisms,
incantations, and prayer. Also, the perception of the mentally ill as morally
weak resulted in them being jailed as criminals and often put to death
(Corrigan& Watson, 2002). Through time, individuals with mental
illness were metaphorically described as ‘wild beasts’ that needed to be
confined. The belief about mental illness was later
altered by the Greek physician Hippocrates, who rejected the supernatural
perspectives about mental illness and argued that psychological symptoms have
natural causes, just like physical symptoms. Institutions like the
Bethlem Hospital that isolated the “insane” in the thirteenth century, to the
Salpêtrière Hospital that was built in the seventeenth century, grew in number
and sophistication. The close of the eighteenth century witnessed paradigm
shifts regarding mental illness in parts of Europe. ‘Mad-houses’ where the
‘violent’ and ‘dangerous’ were accommodated changed to ‘asylums’ where the
mentally ill could be treated and brought back as functional individuals in
society (“History of Mental Illness”).
Several studies (Crisp, Gelder, Rix, Meltzer et al., 2000; Bryne,
1997; Heginbotham, 1998) have demonstrated how those with mental illness still
suffer from social and perceived stigma. Psychiatric labels that discriminate
the mentally ill from the rest of the society causes social stigma,
characterized by prejudicial attitudes and discriminating behavior. On the
other hand, when the sufferers of discrimination internalize the feelings of
shame, it is referred to as perceived stigma or self-stigma, leading to poorer
treatment outcomes (Perlick et al., 2001). Etymologically, the word ‘stigma’
comes from the Greek word ‘stigmata’ which refers to “a mark of shame or discredit; a stain, or an identifying mark or
characteristic” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). About mental
illness, stigma is a multifaceted construct that involves attitudes, behaviors,
and feelings. It is “a collection of negative attitudes, beliefs,
thoughts, and behaviors that influences the individual, or the general
public, to fear, reject, avoid, be prejudiced, and discriminate against people
with mental disorders” (Gary, 2005, p. 980). Moreover, stigma acts as a
mediating process which legitimizes and normalizes discrimination and violence
against people suffering from mental illness. Surveys conducted among the
general public demonstrate that most people approached the mentally ill with
caution and presumed that they were generally hard to talk to. Such negative
impressions often persist in people across cultures despite most of them being
aware of the travails of mental illness through witnessing the illness
condition in close familial and social circles. More recent studies (Wang &
Lai, 2008; Reavley & Jorm, 2011) reveal that a significant proportion of
the public considered that people with mental illnesses such as depression or
schizophrenia were unpredictable, dangerous and they would be less likely to
employ someone with a mental health problem. In an initiative of the
Scattergood Foundation, general stereotypes of the sort are studied and
addressed based on statistical facts. In response to the predominant stereotype
about the mentally ill as dangerous and violent, they remarked:
Most people with mental
illness never commit acts of violence and are more likely than others to be
victims of violence. The reality is that people who do not have mental health
conditions commit most violent crimes. In fact, according to data from the
National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, only 3% of
people with mental illness are violent. That means 97% of people with mental
illness are not violent. (Scattergood Foundation, 2018).
The mentally ill are labeled as deviants by society; as dysfunctional
individuals in the framework of society. Becker (1963) remarks, “[s]ocial
groups create deviance by making the rules when infraction constitutes deviance
and by applying their rules to particular people and labeling them as
outsiders” (p. 9). As the mentally ill inhabit an alternate reality, it is
assumed that they are naturally bound to break the rules of a particular
society. Ironically, the understanding of what constitutes ‘abnormality’
differs from one society to another; in other words, what is abnormal for one
society or culture may be normal for another. However, Kleinman (2009) argues
that mental health professionals themselves, family members, and sufferers are
often the most effective and efficient transmitters of stigma due to factors
such as poor conditions of care and social/financial burdens of care (p. 603).
Stigma in psychiatric institutions enables serious abuse of the mentally ill as
evidenced in several studies: use of “unmodified electroconvulsive
therapy”; violence, including sexual violence: “Against adults and children…by
staff or fellow patients” (Patel, Kleinman, and Saraceno, 2012, p. 367).
Furthermore, seclusion and isolation, as well as passivization and inactivity
of patients in psychiatric institutions, amplify the obstacles to patients’
subsequent participation in the ordinary life and everyday social experience
(Patel, Kleinman, and Saraceno, 2012).
Medical Discourse
and the Stigma of Mental Illness
The
field of biomedicine is not immune to popular beliefs about mental illness.
According to Corrigan & Watson (2002) and
Hugo (2001), most mental health professionals also subscribe to negative
stereotypes about mental illness. Statistical surveys conducted as part of
their study has revealed that medical professional groups were less optimistic
about prognosis and long-term outcomes in this regard. Ironically, the approach
of the general public towards the mentally ill is much healthier as they at
least acknowledge the individuality and identity of the sufferer. People with mental illness
commonly report “feeling devalued, dismissed, and dehumanized” by many of the
health professionals who treat them. Such stigmatizing experiences include
“feeling excluded from decisions, receiving subtle or overt threats of coercive
treatment, being made to wait excessively long when seeking help, being given
insufficient information about one’s condition or treatment options, being
treated in a paternalistic or demeaning manner, being told they would never get
well, and being spoken to or about using stigmatizing language” (Knaak, Mantler
& Szeto, 2017). The dehumanizing approach of
mental health professionals not only contributes to the stigma (Penn &
Martin, 1998) but also result in worsening the condition of the ill (Sadow et
al., 2002).
Although inhuman treatment
practices in asylums could be linked to the cultural factors that shaped
physicians’ prejudice towards the mentally ill as impassive exiles from a
‘normal,’ functional society, the typology of illustrated histories of medicine
legitimized such attitudes. Sander Gilman, in his seminal investigation of the
illustrated histories of mental illness, traces several examples that reflected
the cultural history of madness and legitimized its claims in academic
psychiatry. Gilman in Seeing the Insane (1982) and Picturing
Health and Illness: Images of Identity and Difference (1995) critically
examines visual representations of the mentally ill across centuries as
“cultural fantasies of health, disease, and the body” (1995, p. 18). Gilman
unveils the selection and editing involved in choosing visual representations
of the mentally ill and claims that the use of pictures in medical texts cannot
be deemed as naïve but highly manipulative. The overarching claim of these
representations, Gilman argues, is that there is no internal reality to be
examined, only the external world internalized and represented in art (1995, p.
19). Irrespective of the medium—illustrations or photographs—these visual
representations emphasized the need for the psychiatrists to see the
patient and his/her signs and symptoms as the key to diagnosis. Intriguingly,
such medical iconography was not distinct from the presumptions of madness in
the general iconography of Western representational art. As such, the field of
psychiatry was obsessed with creating a visual epistemology from which the
subjectivity of the patient was completely absent. As Gilman (2011) observes:
Picturing is moved from
being an individual act in a historical context to that of the collective,
self-labeled as “scientists” without much consideration to the mechanisms
present. . . . It is, as Peter Novick argued decades ago, the creation of an
academic notion of the subjectivity out of the subjectivity of the historical
agent.
As such, these visual representations control
medical perceptions of the mentally ill binding the general misconceptions and
anxieties about madness. Most representations followed the beauty/ugly binary
based on the patient’s physiognomic features. By the close of the eighteenth
century, the association of madness with specific physiognomy had become
commonplace in European thought. Although Phillipe Pinel is highly regarded for
introducing humane treatment and reform in French asylums, he is also
instrumental in altering perspectives on psychopathology. In his Treatise on
Insanity (1801), Pinel included two images comparing the shape of the skull
of two patients. The analysis further developed to include comparisons with the
ideal proportions of Greek sculpture, thus measuring the physiognomy of the
mentally ill on the plane of aesthetic perceptions (Gilman, 2014, p. 73).
Moreover, such perceptions even
led various psychiatrists to propose comparisons with the physiognomy of
animals to perceive the mental status of their patients and to distinguish them
from the ideal structure of a normal person. For instance, August Krauss’ table
of animal analogs demonstrates how madness was perceived in terms of patient’s
physiognomic features. Hidden implications of such parallels drawn
between physiognomic ugliness and mental impairment connote to the construction
of categories of beauty/health and ugliness/illness. These essential categories
may cater to the aesthetics of a particular group or class as well as specific
individual aesthetics of the time. Here, Krauss’ question of physiognomy and
the features of the various breeds of horse could be read as encoded in the
cultural ethos of science in the nineteenth century. In this context, Gilman (2011)
rightly comments on the necessity to keenly observe the nuanced braiding of the
public and private reveries of mental illness thus:
The role of the study of
medical (in the broadest sense) representations, or perhaps better, images of
health and illness and their attendant social and cultural settings need to be
addressed. The function of representations and those trained to study and
analyze them in the history of medicine is to knit the function of public and
private representations with the continuities and discontinuities in attitudes
and beliefs both within and beyond the health sciences.
These prejudiced manifestations of the mentally ill
not only affect the physician’s attitude towards the mentally ill but also
precipitate negative metaphors in the cultural discourse on mental illness.
Representation of
Mental Illness in Popular Culture
As in medical discourse, a tendency to visualize
mental illness also exists within art and popular culture. A careful analysis
of the history of visual representations of the mentally ill reveals a set of
repeated, stereotyped ideas/images from the 16th century to
contemporary popular culture. Cumulatively, these representations of the
mentally ill reflect the dominant attitudes and behaviors towards them, that
is, a constant fear of the Other. Further, they also reinforce the presumed
boundaries between normal and abnormal. The stereotypical cultural
representation of the diseased body and its psychological manifestation as a
dangerous ‘other’ is reflected in illness discourses across time.
In making a clear
distinction between the ill and the healthy, several representations in art
also characterize the mentally ill as animals devoid of human qualities. As
Foucault remarks, “madness had become a thing to look at: no longer a monster
inside oneself, but an animal with strange mechanisms, a bestiality from which
man had long since been suppressed” (2005, p. 66). Foucault’s observation
unveils the predominant cultural logic of considering the “mad” as a beast
which must be confined and controlled. One of the earliest examples of
metaphorizing madness as animalistic is reflected in Charles Bell’s Madman (1806).
The image reflects the larger cultural anxiety of not being able to identify
with a person with mental illness and feeds the desire to alienate them from
the ‘normal’ society. The ‘madman’s’ glance directed away from the readers
characterized by indignant gestures, suggests unpredictability and impending
danger. Like an untamed animal, the ‘madman’ is chained and left naked. Interestingly,
the image reciprocates the predominant middle age fantasies about madness. Such
persistent notions about the mentally ill reflect the cultural preoccupations
of controlling and taming the undesirable—other inconspicuous ways despite
centuries of evolved scientific and cultural perceptions about mental illness.
Sensationalisation and
stigmatization of mental illness are also evident in popular media
representations. Perpetuating stereotypes and capitalizing on the increased
anxiety, several negative and inaccurate portrayals of mental illness influence
the public perception of mental illness. Most movies deploy illness as a trope
of violence and crime. Scary and dangerous slashers suffer from psychosis.
Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), for instance, features Anthony Perkins
as Norman Bates who kills a female motel guest. The scene of the murder
captures the gruesome details of the slashing and the helplessness of the
female victim, Marion, enacted by Janet Leigh. Norman Bates is not identified
as a mental patient until the end of the film when a psychiatrist explains the
origins of his bizarre behavior. Since Psycho, slasher movies which
peaked in popularity in the late 1970s and continue through the 1980s and beyond
improvise the same theme. The elements of violence and fear are exaggerated
with dramatic special effects in these movies. Otto F. Wahl in Media
Madness: Public Images of Mental Illness observes that mentally ill
characters in movies and different television shows were more likely to be undeniably
violent villains. The adjectives that best describe the mentally ill in these
representations were “active,” “confused,” “aggressive,” “dangerous” and
“unpredictable” (Wahl, 2003, p. 66).
Several studies (Wahl, Wood, Zaveri,
Drapalski, & Mann, 2003; Wilson et al., 2000) have also shown that
portrayals of the mentally ill in popular movies are mostly negative and thus
perpetuate stereotypes about mental illness. Even in technical details such as
framing and point of view, these representations convey that the mentally ill
are different from other characters. Moreover, pejorative terms such as
“crazy,” “psycho,” “deranged,” and “loony” are often used by other characters to
refer to the mentally ill (Goldstein, 1979; Wahl, Wood, Zaveri, Drapalski,
& Mann, 2003; Wilson et al., 2000). Apart from Psycho, many films
such as Miloš Forman’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975), and Tony
Bill’s Crazy People (1990) exploit such terms to intrigue and entertain
the viewer. The characters themselves are often portrayed with distinctive and
unattractive features like rotting teeth or unruly hair (Wilson et al., 2000).
In exploring television images of madness, Simon Cross studies “Whose Mind is
it Anyway” a British television show, which aims to present the implications of
releasing mental patients from asylums. Each shot fully exploits the standard
icons of dangerous insanity in the patient’s crooked facial expressions and
disheveled appearances. The presenter explains to viewers that a “mentally
disturbed man has been seen brandishing a knife at a local restaurant.” The
next shot presents a police car with the siren sounding, moving at speed to
catch the dangerously insane. Such negative images of violence and control permeate
almost all filmic representations of the mentally ill. Films such as Bug
(2006), Split (2016), and Bird Box (2018) also draw icons from
the violent stereotype of madness. Jane Pirkis and others (2006) in “On-Screen
Portrayals of Mental Illness: Extent, Nature, and Impacts” categorize such
stereotypes from filmic representations thus: the homicidal maniac, the
rebellious free spirit, the female patient as a seductress, the narcissistic
parasite, and the zoo specimen (pp. 528-529). As such, these portrayals reduce
the mentally ill to essentially negative categories. In a different vein, few
filmic representations also perpetuate unscientific and unrealistic notions
about mental illness and coping strategies. Silver Linings Playbook (2012),
for instance, presents unrealistic ways of managing bipolar disorder. Although
the first half of the movie bluntly portray the dysfunction of the characters
and the travails of bipolar disorder on the family, it over-emphasizes an easy
recovery when the two main characters engage in a romantic relationship. The
Visit (2015) also inaccurately portray those with schizophrenia as
struggling with murderous tendencies. The mentally ill characters in the movie
are represented as inherently dangerous with odd behaviors, hallucinations, and
paranoia.
Comics, “the only
proximate medium of film” (Chute, 2010, p.221) is also not excluded from
such negative/distorted images of mental illness. Alan Moore and Dave Gibbon’s Watchmen,
for instance, presents characters like Rorschach, the Incredible
Hulk, and David “Legion” Haller as victims of trauma and are often marginalized
and socially excluded. Within such an environment, their mental health problems
unsurprisingly worsen. “Rorschach is dismissed as paranoid and crazy by his
fellow costumed adventurers, leading him to spiral downward until he believes
violent murder to be the only viable option in his war on crime. The Hulk is
ostracized for being a monster and becomes even more dangerous the more
isolated he gets” (Langley, 2018). Similarly, Batman series also
reinforces the violent stereotype of insanity in characters like Two-Face
(split personality disorder) and The Joker (Psychopath) who set the standard
for a typical villain in most comic books that followed. The New York Times published
an article by psychiatrists H. Eric Bender, Praveen Kambam, and
Vasilis Pozios in 2011 challenged the distorted representations of the mentally
ill in DC comics:
[W]hen contemporary psychiatric terms or disorders have
been used in stories; they have been misapplied to explain villainy. As Grant
Morrison, a well-known comic author, wrote recently, “The rest of Batman’s
rogues’ gallery personified various psychiatric disorders to great effect:
Two-Face was schizophrenia.” But Two-Face’s central quality, a split
personality, isn’t characteristic of schizophrenia. Similarly, the Joker is
often called “psychotic,” despite a lack of hallucinations or other symptoms of
a psychotic disorder. True, some say, “these are just comic books.” But such
inaccuracies perpetuate harmful stereotypes.
Sensationalized media reports of real events also
influence the public perception of the mentally ill. Research indicates that
most news reports represent the mentally ill person as violent and criminal
than benign or sympathetic (Wahl, 2003, p. 67). Along with the prevalent notion
of the mentally ill as fundamentally flawed and evil rather than as an ill
person, news reports frequently suggest that those with mental illness cannot
be cured completely despite treatment. Catering to the common plot pattern of
the mentally ill who are bent on terrorizing the innocent, these reports
demonstrate the ineffectiveness of treatment for the mentally ill. For
instance, newspaper reports like the one published in the New York Post on
May 9, 1982, confirms the evidence that former patients will be prone to
violence even after treatment. The catchy headline, “Freed Mental Patient Kills
Mom” in bold capital letters provokes the readers to assume that those once
labeled as mentally ill must be approached with caution. As such, the patients
continue to experience the stigma of exclusion and violence throughout their
lives, even after being medically cured.
Reports on the mentally ill as the dangerous Other and
the deliberate use of phrases like “crazy” in describing them further
reinforces the metaphors and stereotypes that dehumanize the mentally ill. In
other words, such reiterated usages diminish the “credibility, trustworthiness,
and value” of the person suffering from mental illness (Wahl et al. 2003, p. 559).
Biased and sensationalized reports as such mislead the public by portraying the
mentally ill as aggressive, dangerous, and unpredictable. Pamela Kalbfleisch (1979)
studied newspaper homicide stories in the United States to observe recurrent
patterns that these reports follow in making issues “newsworthy.” Accordingly,
she identifies (i) insanity, (ii) unpredictability, and (iii) victimization of
ordinary people as the three basic ingredients for a “top story.” Editors
highlight stories with such features, for wider readership at the cost of the
stigma that it precipitates towards the mentally ill.
On the contrary, a recent study by Marian Chen and
Stephen Lawrie (2017) reveals that “only 5% of the homicides carried out in the
general population between 2001 and 2011 were by those with an abnormal mental
state” (p. 309). Also, it is found that those with a mental disorder are more
inclined to self-harm than harm others. Despite these facts, news media
perpetuates sensationalist notions about mental illness that dehumanize
patients to the extent that they are defined by these presumed symptoms of
their illness.
Additionally, these connotations of violence and
unpredictability that are ascribed to mental illness are unrestrainedly followed
in reporting other social issues as well. For instance, newspaper articles
inappropriately utilize psychiatric terms to refer to those actions/people that
it does not approve of. Wahl (2003) cites several examples from newspaper
reports in which dictators like Saddam Hussein were repeatedly referred to as
“madman” and “as crazy as Hitler” (p. 27). In a recent newspaper report
published by Independent, the President of the United States, Donald
Trump was referred to as a “psychopath” posing an “enormous present danger”
(Kentish, 2017). Although Hussein, Hitler, or Trump are functional individuals
who are in control of their faculties, their hostile and fanatical actions are
impulsively connoted to mental instability. While subtly acknowledging that
these men are not mentally ill, news reports such as these which passively use
labels of mental illness without discretion as such discredit those suffering
from the illness.
When media representations
of mental illness present false perceptions, even medical definitions about
mental illness may not serve the full purpose of redeeming the validity of
one’s lived experience of illness. W.J.T. Mitchell, in a lecture titled “What,
do Pictures Want” argues that madness, as represented in popular media, is not
necessarily at the periphery of human experience. Departing from the
symptomatic definitions of schizophrenia, Mitchell presents an alternate
perspective about the illness which is unavailable in popular representations
of schizophrenia. As such, he argues, “schizophrenia can be understood as an
intensified form of normal mental activity of the work of reason, memory, and
imagination spinning out of control; the perfectly ordinary process of inner
vision and audition exaggerated so that fantasy take on a tactile and visceral
reality” (Muzeum 2013). His deliberate choice of the words “normal,”
“ordinary,” and “reality” reflects an attempt to free madness from its
confinement in the discourse of medicine and popular culture as an abnormal and
exotic abstraction.
Reinforced by different media representations,
such dehumanized metaphors of violence and idiocy permeate into everyday
language and slang words which connote to mental illness. As advertisements aim
to attract the viewers’ attention, they often deploy slang terms and offensive
images of mental illness. Especially, advertisements for peanuts engage in a
wordplay on the double meaning of “nuts.”
For instance, a particular peanut product was packed as a gift bag in a
straightjacket labeled “Certifiably Nuts.” The package was branded with a
“patient history,” stating that the owner’s family had been “nuts for
generations.” Although tags such as these imply the quality of the product as
time-tested, they subtly convey unscientific notions about hereditary links to
mental illness (Davidson, 2018). Additionally, pulling a string attached to the
peanut package would release hysterical laughter; a characteristic drawn from
stereotyped representations of the mentally ill as idiotic. The product and the
advertisement tags serve as metaphors of mental illness, which construe and
perpetuate negative and stereotyped perceptions about those suffering from
mental illness. Interestingly, the product even won the CLIO award for their
innovative idea, which denotes the apathy of the advertisement industry to the
plight of those with mental illness. Such deliberate use of psychiatric
terminology in non-contextual fields not only conveys a lack of recognition of
the sufferings of the mentally ill but also promotes distorted notions about
the mentally ill in public.
Consistency in the negative representations of mental
illness in advertisements further plays a major role in reinforcing the
stereotyped perspectives on mental illness. Most visual representations of the
mentally ill in advertisements emphasize distinctive physical features.
Caricatured wild eyes and unkempt hair, in particular, are defining traits of
the mentally ill in these portrayals. Such distinctions underscore the politics
involved in the selection of images even though the reality of mental illness
is varied and more human.
Abuses of Metaphors
of Mental Illness
Although metaphors are
often inconspicuously deployed in representations of illness, Elaine Scarry
observes that metaphors do not merely function as rhetorical devices but as
tools imbued with ideologies that configure popular perceptions about the illness.
Scarry in The Body in Pain (1985) discusses how the experience of pain
is articulated in language exclusively through metaphors of weaponry and damage
(p. 15). Similarly, Susan Sontag (1991) in Illness as Metaphor traces
metaphors that conceptualize disease as an “evil, invincible predator” (p. 7).
Tracing several figurative uses of diseases as a metaphor for monstrosity and destructiveness in nineteenth-century literature, Sontag attempts
to reveal its origin in social prejudices and stereotypes. Sontag (1991) clarifies
how military metaphors “contribute to the stigmatizing of certain illnesses and
by extension, of those who are ill” (p. 97). Especially in literary
representations of diseases like cancer and TB, the predominant metaphors are
that of war and invasion; to quote Sontag (1991), “[i]n TB, the person is
‘consumed,’ burned up. In cancer, the patient is ‘invaded’ by alien cells” (p. 14).
In the context of mental illness, popular media like
movies and advertisements configure several metaphors as identified by Scarry
and Sontag. Advertisements on mental health, for instance, often follow a
tragedy narrative with sad faces in dim background and lighting which
stereotype mental illnesses like depression as a uniform experience. Worse
still are pharmaceutical advertisements where metaphors of sadness and gloom
prevail until the patient is medicated with a particular drug. These
advertisements portray medication as a sole method of dealing with mental
illnesses. Accordingly, these advertisements reconfigure the background setting
with metaphors of hope and happiness. For instance, S. E Smith (2011) refers to
early advertisements on Prozac®, a drug used for
treating depression, which features characters who engage in heavy-handed
metaphors like opening the blinds to “let the sunshine in.” In averting
the mental health condition, he observes, “[p]atients
should just take a pill..... according to the narrative in pharmaceutical
advertising, when the truth can be more complicated.” Such portrayals shadow
the significance of mental support that friends and family could provide the
mentally ill as a path to recovery, apart from medication.
Against such stereotyped representations of mental
illness, Sue Estroff argues that mental illness cannot be reduced to an object;
it is not “something that someone has, and that is external to whoever
is experiencing it” (as cited in Vanthuyne,2003, p. 413). On the contrary, the
experience of mental illness is “socially situated, individualized version of a
body of cultural knowledge” (Vanthuyne, 2003, p. 413). However, the different
cultural idioms and stereotypes that are hierarchically positioned within a
network of power relationships constitute deleterious metaphors of mental
illness which appropriate subjective experiences to popular expectations. The
Peanut advertisement, horror movie posters, and Bill Lee’s cartoon discussed in
this essay reveal how metaphors of violence and idiocy frame popular
perceptions of mental illness. In a close analysis of these visual
representations of mental illness across popular media, one becomes aware of
the visual attributes and nuances that construct metaphoric meanings that have a
deleterious impact on those suffering from the illness. In this context,
Aristotle’s contention proves significant: “Metaphors, like epithets, must be
fitting, which means they must fairly correspond to the thing signified:
failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous” (1984, p. 2240).
Similarly, metaphors of mental illness that circulate in medical discourse
through psychiatric idioms prevent the mentally ill and their community from
exploring the diverse socio-political perspectives and singular experiences of
living with mental illness.
Coda: Implications
The prejudices
perpetuated towards the mentally ill and the stigma that it engenders determine
the societal attitudes towards those suffering from mental illness. Patients are
doubly challenged by the stereotypes that ensue from misconceptions about
mental illness, apart from the physical and emotional quandaries of their
illness experience. As such, representations that negatively portray the
mentally ill would also shape the perspectives of professional and
non-professional caregivers towards the mentally ill. Prejudiced assumptions
about the illness would cause caregivers to disregard the individuality of
patients or the distinct nature of the illness. In this context, the absence of
personal accounts of illness or accurate representations of patients’
subjective reality, the mentally ill would be subject to systematic exclusion
from civic and social life. Particularly, in policy-making and resource
allocation, the mentally ill are denied of opportunities required for quality
living ranging from satisfactory job and healthcare facilities to affiliation
with a diverse group of people (Corrigan & Watson, 2002).
Furthermore, the representations of the mentally ill as
violent and unpredictable in popular media have adverse effects on diverse
domains of the patient’s life. Approached with caution and distrust, these
individuals would continue to live with shame and guilt despite being cured of
illness. As such, the label of mental illness, the exaggerated and grossly
distorted representations of it and the self-stigma and public stigma induced
by it subtly determine their intrasubjective and intersubjective
realities.
Note
1See Cherril
Hicks’ “Dozens of mental disorders don’t exist” published in the wake of World
Mental Health Day.
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Correspondence
to: Sweetha Saji, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Institute
of Technology (NIT), Tiruchirappalli,
Tamil Nadu, India.
Sathyaraj Venkatesan (Ph.D., the Indian
Institute of Technology (IIT), Kanpur, 2008) is an Associate Professor of
English in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the National Institute
of Technology, Tiruchirappalli, India. He was a Fellow at the School of
Criticism and Theory at Cornell University, New York and currently, an
International Field Bibliographer with the Publications of Modern Language
Association of America (PMLA). His research interests include literature
and medicine, graphic medicine, critical medical humanities.
Sweetha
Saji is a PhD Research Scholar in the Department of Humanities and Social
Sciences at the National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirappalli, India. Her
research concentrates on Graphic Medicine and Medical Humanities.